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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case arises out of a federal habeas corpus action 
brought by a prisoner in state custody. The Commonwealth1 
originally argued that the prisoner's petition was successive 
and should therefore be dismissed. The District Court 
dismissed the petition as successive, and the prisoner 
appealed. On appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that the 
petition actually was not successive, but offered no 
alternative legal grounds upon which we could have 
affirmed the District Court's decision. Thus, we remanded. 
On remand, the Commonwealth argued for the first time 
that the prisoner's petition was barred by the applicable 
one-year statute of limitations. The prisoner objected to the 
untimeliness of the Commonwealth's assertion of its 
limitations defense, but the District Court dismissed the 
habeas petition as time-barred. 
 
On appeal, the prisoner argues (1) that the 
Commonwealth waived its limitations defense, or in the 
alternative, (2) that if the Commonwealth did not waive its 
limitations defense, then he is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing to determine if the statute of limitations should be 
equitably tolled because the Commonwealth allegedly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "Commonwealth" will be used throughout this opinion to refer to the 
Appellees collectively. 
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deprived him of the legal papers necessary to file his 
petition in a timely fashion. Because we find that the 
Commonwealth did not raise its affirmative defense at the 
earliest practicable moment, we hold that the 
Commonwealth waived its limitations defense.2 We will 
therefore reverse and remand. 
 
I. 
 
Appellant, Eric Robinson, was convicted in a bench trial 
before the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia of first 
degree murder, conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking, 
robbery, and possession of an instrument of crime. He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction 
and a concurrent aggregate sentence of twenty to thirty-five 
years imprisonment on the remaining counts. 
 
Robinson filed a direct appeal in the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment. See 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 481 A.2d 1376 (Pa. Super. 
1984) (table). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 
Robinson's request for discretionary review. This ended the 
direct review of Robinson's case. 
 
Robinson then filed a pro se petition for collateral relief 
under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act  
("PCHA"),3 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 9541 et seq. (1984), 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The court 
appointed counsel to represent Robinson, and it 
subsequently denied his petition for relief. This denial of 
collateral relief was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 563 A.2d 194 (Pa. 
Super. 1989) (table). Robinson did not petition for allocatur 
with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
 
On August 29, 1991, Robinson filed his first federal 
habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, insufficiency of evidence, and violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. A Magistrate Judge issued a Report 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Thus, we will not address the equitable tolling argument. 
 
3. The Post Conviction Hearing Act has since been substantially 
amended and is now titled the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 9541 et seq. (2000). 
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and Recommendation which concluded that Robinson's 
failure to pursue discretionary review in the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim constituted a procedural default. The District Court 
adopted the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, 
concluding that the ineffectiveness claim had been 
procedurally defaulted. See Order, Robinson v. Vaughn, No. 
91-5422 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 1991). 
 
Robinson appealed that decision, and we denied 
Robinson's request for issuance of a certificate of probable 
cause because of Robinson's failure to exhaust his state 
remedies. See Order, Robinson v. Vaughn , No. 91-2107 (3d 
Cir. Apr. 8, 1992). Thus, as to the ineffectiveness claim, 
Robinson's first federal habeas petition was dismissed so 
that he could exhaust his remedies in the Commonwealth. 
 
Robinson returned to the Commonwealth courts and filed 
a second petition under the PCRA, again alleging ineffective 
assistance of his trial counsel and now also alleging the 
ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel. This application 
was denied, and Robinson did not appeal. 
 
Robinson filed a third state application for post- 
conviction relief. That petition was denied by the Court of 
Common Pleas. Robinson then appealed to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the denial. 
See Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. 03093 Phila. 1994, 
679 A.2d 257 (Pa. Super. 1996) (table). Robinson petitioned 
for, and was denied, allocatur by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 683 A.2d 880 (Pa. 
1996) (table). 
 
Robinson filed his second federal habeas petition, which 
is the one at issue in this appeal, on September 5, 1998, 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for 
habeas relief. His petition also reasserts as grounds for 
habeas relief the insufficiency of the evidence against him 
and the allegedly unlawful seizure of evidence in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Robinson's petition was referred to a Magistrate Judge 
who ordered a responsive pleading including "specific and 
detailed answers and a brief or memorandum of law in 
support thereof" from the Office of the District Attorney of 
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Philadelphia on November 10, 1998. On January 27, 1999, 
the District Attorney filed a letter pleading which argued 
that Robinson's petition should be transferred to the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit because it was a successive 
petition. The District Attorney contended that the denial of 
Robinson's first federal habeas petition in 1991 precluded 
relief because he had not received permission for a 
successive petition from this Court as is required by the 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 
28 U.S.C. SS 2241 et seq. The Magistrate Judge 
recommended denying Robinson's second federal habeas 
petition, and on April 26, 1999, the District Court accepted 
the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and denied the 
petition. 
 
Robinson appealed that decision, and we ordered the 
District Attorney to show cause why the order dismissing 
the petition should not be summarily reversed in light of 
our decision in Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 
1997), where we held that when a federal habeas petition 
has been dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust 
state remedies, a petitioner, after exhausting his state 
remedies, need not apply to the court of appeals for 
authorization to file a federal habeas action, but may file 
his petition in the district court as if it were his first such 
filing. On December 23, 1999, the District Attorney filed a 
letter brief conceding that Robinson's second federal habeas 
petition indeed was not successive. The District Attorney 
did not present any alternative legal grounds for affirming 
the District Court's conclusion. Thus, we accepted the 
Commonwealth's concession and summarily reversed and 
remanded. 
 
On remand, Robinson filed a motion to strike his original 
petition and for permission to file an amended petition 
which the Magistrate Judge granted. The District Attorney 
moved for reconsideration of the order permitting Robinson 
to amend his petition. Then on March 30, 2000, the District 
Attorney asserted that Robinson's second federal habeas 
petition was time-barred by the limitations provision of the 
AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d). Robinson, in return, argued 
that the Commonwealth's statute of limitations defense was 
untimely. 
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The Magistrate Judge vacated his initial order granting 
Robinson leave to amend his petition, and instead 
substituted a Report and Recommendation adopting the 
District Attorney's argument that Robinson's second federal 
habeas petition should be dismissed on statute of 
limitations grounds. In particular, the Magistrate Judge 
concluded that (1) Robinson's third state petition had not 
been "properly filed" because it involved claims subject to a 
state procedural default rule and did not toll the period of 
limitations; (2) therefore, Robinson's second federal habeas 
petition was required to be filed on or before April 23, 1997; 
(3) alternatively, if the third state habeas petition had been 
"properly filed," then Robinson's second federal habeas 
petition should have been filed on or before September 25, 
1997; and (4) finally, because Robinson had access to his 
legal papers for eleven of the twelve months prior to the 
expiration of the September 1997 limitations period, the 
period of limitations should not be equitably tolled. 
 
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report 
and Recommendation over Robinson's renewed objection 
that the Commonwealth had waived its limitations defense 
and Robinson's further proffer regarding the efforts he had 
made to acquire his legal papers. Robinson noted a timely 
appeal, and the District Court granted his request for a 
certificate of appealability.4 Robinson was granted leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis, and we appointed counsel to 
represent him. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
Our first question is whether it is even possible for a 
State to waive its AEDPA limitations defense, an issue 
which we have not yet specifically addressed. The statute of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although Robinson moved in the Court of Appeals for a certificate of 
appealability, it was the District Court which granted the request. This 
is not a problem since the District Court may grant sua sponte a 
certificate of appealability. See Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 456 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
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limitations provision of the AEDPA provides, in pertinent 
part: 
 
       A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
       application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 
       custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 
       limitation period shall run from the latest of . . . the 
       date on which the judgment became final by the 
       conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time 
       for seeking such review. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1)(A). The District Court dismissed 
Robinson's habeas petition because it was filed beyond this 
1-year period of limitation. 
 
The law of this Circuit clearly holds that the limitations 
provision of the AEDPA is not jurisdictional in nature. See 
Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 
617-18 (3d Cir. 1998). As such, it is subject to equitable 
modifications such as tolling. Id. (citing Oshiver v. Levin, 
Fishbeign, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 
1994)). 
 
Other courts of appeals (which, like us, do not view the 
AEDPA limitations period as jurisdictional) have held that a 
limitations defense may be waived by a State defendant in 
a habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 260 
F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that "the government 
[had] expressly waive[d] its [AEDPA] statute of limitations 
defense by advocating a remand and `suggesting' the 
conditions for that remand"); Saucier v. Warden, N.H. State 
Prison, 215 F.3d 1312 (table), 2000 WL 739713 (1st Cir. 
2000) (unpublished opinion) (finding that government did 
not waive its AEDPA statute of limitations defense, even 
though it did not assert the defense in its answer, where 
the petitioner showed no prejudice; thus implying that 
government waiver is possible); Scott v. Johnson , 227 F.3d 
260 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that the government did not 
waive its AEDPA statute of limitations defense, thus 
implying that government waiver is possible); Samuel v. 
Duncan, 92 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1996) (table) (unpublished 
opinion) (AEDPA statute of limitations defense can be 
waived). 
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We join these courts of appeals and now hold that 
because the AEDPA limitations period is subject to 
equitable modifications such as tolling, it is also subject to 
other non-jurisdictional, equitable considerations, such as 
waiver. 
 
B. 
 
Parties are generally required to assert affirmative 
defenses early in litigation, so they may be ruled upon, 
prejudice may be avoided, and judicial resources may be 
conserved. Habeas proceedings are no exception. Rule 11 of 
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United 
States District Courts (the "Habeas Rules") makes the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to habeas 
petitions to the extent they are not inconsistent with the 
Habeas Rules. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires 
that a defendant plead an affirmative defense, such as a 
statute of limitations defense, in his answer. Rule 8(c) 
states: 
 
       Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding 
       pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . 
       statute of limitations . . . and any other matter 
       constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 
 
The purpose of requiring the defendant to plead available 
affirmative defenses in his answer is to avoid surprise and 
undue prejudice by providing the plaintiff with notice and 
the opportunity to demonstrate why the affirmative defense 
should not succeed. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. 
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971); see also Williams 
v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 1995) 
("The purpose of Rule 8(c) is to give the court and the other 
parties fair warning that a particular line of defense will be 
pursued."); Grant v. Preferred Research, Inc. , 885 F.2d 795, 
797 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The Supreme Court has held that the 
purpose of Rule 8(c) is to give the opposing party notice of 
the affirmative defense and a chance to rebut it.") (citing 
Blonder-Tongue); Marino v. Otis Eng'g Corp. , 839 F.2d 1404, 
1408 (10th Cir. 1988) ("The purpose behind rule 8(c) . . . [is 
to] put[ ] `plaintiff on notice well in advance of trial that 
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defendant intends to present a defense in the nature of an 
avoidance.") (citations omitted); Perez v. United States, 830 
F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The central purpose of the 
Rule 8(c) requirement that affirmative defenses be pled is to 
prevent unfair surprise. `A defendant should not be 
permitted to `lie behind a log' and ambush a plaintiff with 
an unexpected defense.' "). 
 
Technically, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require 
that affirmative defenses be pleaded in the answer. Rule 
12(b) states that "[e]very defense . . . shall be asserted in 
the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader 
be made by motion . . . ." The defenses listed in Rule 12(b) 
do not include limitations defenses. Thus, a limitations 
defense must be raised in the answer, since Rule 12(b) does 
not permit it to be raised by motion. However, the law of 
this Circuit (the so-called "Third Circuit Rule") permits a 
limitations defense to be raised by a motion under Rule 
12(b)(6), but only if "the time alleged in the statement of a 
claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought 
within the statute of limitations."5  Hanna v. U.S. Veterans' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The "Third Circuit Rule" dates back at least to 1948 when we 
recognized in Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 139 (3d Cir. 1948), 
that affirmative defenses are ordinarily pleaded pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(c), but that the defense could be raised in other ways. See also 
Williams v. Murdoch, 330 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1964) (affirmative 
defense of res judicata may be raised by a motion to dismiss or by an 
answer); Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep't , 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 
1989) ("When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of 
limitations grounds, we must determine whether `the time alleged in the 
statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been 
brought within the statute of limitations.' " (citations omitted)); Davis 
v. 
Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 623 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Cito); Oshiver v. 
Levin, Fishbeign, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1994) ("While the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) indicates that a 
statute 
of limitations defense cannot be used in the context of Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, an exception is made where the complaint facially 
shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative 
defense clearly appears on the face of the pleading."); Rycoline Prods., 
Inc. v. C&W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirmative 
defense must be apparent on the face of the complaint to be subject to 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). 
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Admin. Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1975). "If the 
bar is not apparent on the face of the complaint, then it 
may not afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6)." Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 
F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 
The Commonwealth argues, and we agree, that a 
limitations defense does not necessarily have  to be raised in 
the answer. But it does not follow that a limitations defense 
can be raised at any time. Consistent with the purpose of 
Rule 8(c), courts require that defendants assert a 
limitations defense as early as reasonably possible. See 
Davis v. Bryan, 810 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The statute of 
limitations is an affirmative defense under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(c) that must be asserted in a party's responsive pleading 
`at the earliest possible moment' and is a personal defense 
that is waived if not promptly pleaded.") (citations omitted); 
Banks v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1416 
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Paetz v. United States, 795 F.2d 1533 
(11th Cir. 1986); Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 
1992); Day v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 1012, 
1015-16 (11th Cir. 1997) (employer waived statute of 
limitations defense to AEDPA claim by not raising it until 
after a jury verdict in its motion to alter or amend 
judgment). 
 
Courts routinely consider the timeliness of a limitations 
defense. Although some have adhered to the strict language 
of Rule 8(c), which requires that a limitations defense be 
raised in the answer, others have considered the stage of 
the proceedings at which the limitations defense is first 
raised. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Venters v. City 
of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1997), found that the 
defendants waived their statute of limitations defense when 
they did not raise it until late in the proceedings. In 
Venters, the defendants did not include their statute of 
limitations defense in their answer to the original and 
amended complaints. Id. at 968. Instead,"the first and only 
mention of the statute of limitations came in their reply 
memorandum in support of the motion for summary 
judgment, submitted a year after the case was filed." Id. 
The court acknowledged that many cases "recognize that 
the failure to plead an affirmative defense can be harmless, 
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notwithstanding the terms of Rule 8(c)," id. , but found that 
in this case the defendants had deprived the plaintiff of fair 
notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond to their 
affirmative defense by not raising it until "the parties had 
largely completed an exhaustive discovery process, and the 
scheduled trial date was only a month away." Id. See also 
Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152, 1155 (2d 
Cir. 1968) ("[W]here the party seeking to amend [the 
answer] wishes to raise a defense of limitations long after 
the answer was first filed, a court would be remiss if it did 
not carefully balance the effects of such action for it is 
manifest that risk of substantial prejudice increases in 
proportion to the length of defendant's delay in seeking the 
amendment. . . . In sum, the party wishing to raise the 
defense is obliged to plead the Statute of Limitations at the 
earliest possible moment."); Hayden v. Ford Motor Co., 497 
F.2d 1292, 1295 (6th Cir. 1974) ("Whatever the motives 
behind the plaintiff's and defendant's pleading strategy, to 
allow the defendant to raise the bar of the statute of 
limitations after so long a delay [thirty months] and after so 
many intervening acts had occurred, would make a 
mockery of the intent and purpose of the statute of 
limitations."); Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 1603 v. 
Transue & Williams Corp., 879 F.2d 1388, 1396 n.3 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (rejecting limitations defense as untimely when 
first raised in a motion to amend the district court's 
judgment over a year after the suit was filed). 
 
We have even found a limitations defense to be waived 
where it was pleaded in the answer, but where it was not 
pursued before trial. In Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & 
Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989), the defendant 
raised the statute of limitations defense in its answer, but 
"it did not file a motion or present argument before the 
district court on the statute of limitations issue at any time 
before or at the trial." Id. Then, following a trial and jury 
verdict, the defendant attempted to raise its statute of 
limitations defense in post-trial motions. Id.  at 1154. We 
did not permit this, finding that "it would be grossly unfair 
to allow a plaintiff to go to the expense of trying a case only 
to be met by a new defense after trial." Id.  at 1161. 
 
All of these cases reflect, in one form or another, 
attempts by the courts to keep the consideration of 
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affirmative defenses consistent with at least the purpose, if 
not necessarily the language, of Rule 8(c). Affirmative 
defenses must be raised as early as practicable, not only to 
avoid prejudice, but also to promote judicial economy. If a 
party has a successful affirmative defense, raising that 
defense as early as possible, and permitting a court to rule 
on it, may terminate the proceedings at that point without 
wasting precious legal and judicial resources. 
 
We hold, therefore, that affirmative defenses under the 
AEDPA should be treated the same as affirmative defenses 
in other contexts, and, if not pleaded in the answer, they 
must be raised at the earliest practicable moment 
thereafter. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the question of whether 
Robinson's petition was successive was "logically and 
conceptually prior" to the question of whether the petition 
was time-barred. In support, the Commonwealth points out 
that if Robinson's petition were successive, then no matter 
what it contained nor whether or not it was timely, the 
petition could have been dismissed. We disagree. Although 
the Commonwealth is correct that if the petition were 
successive then it could be disposed of no matter if it were 
timely or not, the Commonwealth fails to recognize that the 
converse is equally true -- that is, if the petition were time- 
barred, it did not matter whether the petition were 
successive or not. There is no logical or conceptual priority 
to the limitations defense. 
 
The Commonwealth took this argument one step further 
during oral argument by pointing to statutory language 
which supports its position that successivity defenses 
should be addressed before limitations defenses. This is not 
an argument that the successivity defense is logically or 
conceptually prior to the limitations defense, but is an 
argument that successivity is statutorily prior to 
limitations. As we will explain, there is some merit to this 
argument, but even accepting it as true does not save the 
Commonwealth's defense. 
 
The Commonwealth's argument rests upon the statutory 
language of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(3)(A). That section states: 
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       Before a second or successive application permitted by 
       this section is filed in the district court, the applicant 
       shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an 
       order authorizing the district court to consider the 
       application. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(3)(A). The Commonwealth placed great 
reliance during oral argument upon the statute's use of the 
word "before." Because a successive petition may not be 
filed in the district court "before" the habeas petitioner 
obtains an order from a court of appeals, the 
Commonwealth argues that successivity defenses must be 
considered before limitations defenses; thus, there is a 
priority between the two created by the text of the statute 
itself. We agree. But the Commonwealth's larger argument 
still fails for two reasons: one textual and one equitable. 
 
First, the language of S 2244(b)(3)(A) places a limitation 
upon habeas petitioners, and, by implication, upon district 
courts. That subsection does not permit a habeas petitioner 
to file a successive petition in a district court without first 
obtaining an authorizing order from a court of appeals. 
Since a successive petition may not be filed in the district 
court without such an order, the statute also impliedly 
limits the ability of a district court to consider a successive 
petition. While the text of the statute thus limits habeas 
petitioners and district courts, it does not limit in any way 
the Commonwealth or a court of appeals. There is nothing 
whatsoever in S 2244(b)(3)(A) which prohibits the 
Commonwealth from complying with the standard practice 
of asserting all affirmative defenses early in litigation. The 
Commonwealth could have raised its limitations defense in 
the District Court along with its successivity defense; 
nothing in the statute prevented it from doing so. 
Furthermore, nothing in S 2244(b)(3)(A) limits a court of 
appeals from considering a limitations defense as an 
alternative legal ground supporting a District Court's 
decision. Here, at minimum, when the Commonwealth 
conceded before us that Robinson's petition was not 
successive, it could have asserted its limitations defense as 
an alternative legal ground upon which we could have 
affirmed the District Court's order dismissing Robinson's 
habeas petition. Doing so would not have contravened 
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S 2244(b)(3)(A) in any way. Thus, the Commonwealth could 
have raised its limitations defense at the earliest practicable 
moment before the District Court or, at the latest, before us 
on its first appeal from the District Court's order without 
offending any statutory provision. 
 
The second reason why the Commonwealth's position 
fails is equitable. We must not forget that while all of this 
legal wrangling goes on, Robinson has been waiting for 
someone to hear the merits of his habeas petition. 
Robinson's ordeal has been prolonged only because of the 
Commonwealth's mistake. Robinson filed a habeas petition. 
It was not successive, but the Commonwealth argued that 
it was. The District Court agreed with the Commonwealth, 
and Robinson was forced to appeal to vindicate his 
position. When asked on appeal to show cause why the 
District Court's order should not be summarily reversed, 
the Commonwealth suddenly saw the light and realized 
that Robinson's petition actually was not successive. The 
Commonwealth had erred. After the case was remanded, 
and after Robinson had been granted permission to file an 
amended complaint, the Commonwealth finally raised its 
limitations defense. This appeal ensued. Meanwhile, 
Robinson has been waiting in prison. If the Commonwealth 
had successfully raised its limitations defense in a timely 
manner, Robinson's equitable tolling argument may have 
been addressed, and if he were successful, there may well 
have been by now a hearing on the merits of Robinson's 
petition. We think it would be patently unfair to penalize 
Robinson for the Commonwealth's error. A rule requiring 
the Commonwealth to raise all its affirmative defenses at 
the earliest practicable moment will prevent unfairness of 
this kind. 
 
C. 
 
We must now apply the rule to the facts of this case. The 
following facts are undisputed: 
 
       1. Robinson filed this habeas action on September 25, 
       1998. 
 
       2. The Commonwealth filed its responsive pleading on 
       January 27, 1999, in which it argued that 
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       Robinson's petition was successive and should not 
       be heard by the District Court, but the 
       Commonwealth did not argue in the alternative 
       that the petition was time-barred. 
 
       3. On April 26, 1999, the District Court accepted the 
       Commonwealth's argument and denied the petition 
       as successive. 
 
       4. Robinson appealed to this Court. 
 
       5. On December 23, 1999, the Commonwealth 
       conceded in its response before this Court that 
       Robinson's petition was not successive, but the 
       Commonwealth did not offer its statute of 
       limitations defense as an alternative ground upon 
       which to affirm to the District Court. 
 
       6. The case was remanded, and the Magistrate Judge 
       granted Robinson's motion to amend his petition. 
 
       7. On March 30, 2000, in a motion to reconsider the 
       order granting permission to amend, the 
       Commonwealth asserted for the first time that 
       Robinson's petition was time barred. 
 
These facts show that the Commonwealth did not raise 
its affirmative limitations defense at the earliest practicable 
moment, as we require. There were at least three points at 
which the Commonwealth could have easily asserted its 
limitations defense, but it failed to do so each time: (1) 
when it defended against the petition before the Magistrate 
Judge only on exhaustion grounds; (2) when it defended 
against the petition before the District Court only on 
exhaustion grounds; and (3) when it withdrew its 
exhaustion defense before this Court without asserting any 
alternative legal grounds upon which the District Court's 
order could have been affirmed. 
 
The Commonwealth waited until after the Magistrate 
Judge had granted Robinson's motion to amend his petition 
before finally asserting its limitations defense-- over one 
and a half years after Robinson`s petition was first filed. 
This was hardly the earliest practicable moment. It is not 
simply the passage of one and a half years that makes the 
Commonwealth's defense untimely, but it is the fact that 
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court proceedings were on-going during that time where 
the Commonwealth was presented with numerous 
opportunities to raise its limitations defense, and it failed to 
do so each time. The Commonwealth did not raise its 
affirmative limitations defense at the earliest practicable 
moment; therefore, we hold that it waived that defense. 
 
III. 
 
In sum, and for the above reasons, we hold that the 
Commonwealth waived its limitations defense to Robinson's 
habeas petition. Therefore, we will reverse the District 
Court's order dismissing Robinson's petition and will 
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion and judgment. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I am pleased to join most of Judge Nygaard's fine opinion 
for the majority. He writes persuasively that a defense of 
the statute of limitations may be waived by a state 
defendant and that the statute of limitations for a habeas 
petition is a defense that can be waived by the state if not 
promptly raised at the earliest practicable moment. 
 
I part company with my colleagues when they hold that 
the Commonwealth waived its statute of limitations defense 
because it had previously challenged Robinson's habeas 
petition as an impermissible second or successive petition. 
I am unpersuaded that as a general rule a habeas 
defendant may not preliminarily raise a successivity 
challenge without losing the opportunity to raise the 
defense of statute of limitations. I believe that AEDPA 
places the defense of successivity on a different level than 
affirmative defenses, such as statute of limitations. 
 
Moreover, even if we were ordinarily to put the 
successivity challenge on the same plane as the other 
defenses, I believe that in the circumstances of this case, 
the Commonwealth should not be held to have waived the 
statute of limitations defense when it sought to address as 
a preliminary matter the successive nature of the petition. 
 
Second or successive petitions for habeas relief have 
always faced significant obstacles to consideration in the 
federal courts because they are, for the most part, wasteful 
of judicial time and effort. The passage of AEDPA in 1996 
strengthened these obstacles by creating a special 
screening process for the consideration of second or 
successive petitions, often referred to as a "gatekeeping 
mechanism." Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996). 
Section 2244(b) provides both procedural and substantive 
limits on the filing of second or successive petitions. One of 
the most significant changes was the requirement that the 
applicant must secure approval from the court of appeals to 
file a successive petition. 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(3)(A) (2001); 
H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996). Unless the court of 
appeals grants such permission, the district court may not 
consider his or her second or successive petition. 
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Review of the language of S 2244(b)(3)(A) makes apparent 
the threshold nature of the inquiry into successivity. The 
statute provides: 
 
       Before a second or successive application permitted by 
       this section is filed in the district court, the applicant 
       shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an 
       order authorizing the district court to consider the 
       application. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
 
I do not agree with the majority that there is no 
significance to the section's introduction to this 
requirement with the word "before." No other defense is 
accompanied by this statutory imperative, and therefore the 
statutory structure gives priority to the successivity 
challenge. The majority agrees that S 2244(b)(3)(A) 
establishes a priority between a successivity defense and a 
limitations defense, which limits the habeas petitioner and 
the district court. Maj. Typescript Op. at 13. It reconciles 
this with its holding that the limitations defense is waived 
because it was not raised at the same time as the 
successivity defense by stating that the statute"does not 
limit in any way the Commonwealth or a court of appeals." 
Maj. Typescript Op. at 13. The majority reasons that"the 
Commonwealth could have raised its limitations defense in 
the District Court along with its successivity defense." Maj. 
Typescript Op. at 13. That is not the way I understand the 
process to work. 
 
When a second or successive habeas petition is 
erroneously filed in a district court without the permission 
of a court of appeals, the district court's only option is to 
dismiss the petition or transfer it to the court of appeals 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1631. The statute limits the 
authority of the district court to consider second or 
successive petitions without an order of the court of 
appeals. Neither the district court nor the government has 
the authority to permit the consideration of a successive 
petition in the district court without prior approval from 
this court: 
 
       [O]nly this court may authorize the commencement of 
       a second or successive petition. . . . From the district 
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       court's perspective, it is an allocation of subject-matter 
       jurisdiction to the court of appeals. A district court 
       must dismiss a second or successive petition, without 
       awaiting any response from the government, unless the 
       court of appeals has given approval for its filing. Even 
       an explicit consent by the government to beginning the 
       case in the district court would be ineffectual; the 
       power to authorize its commencement does not reside 
       in either the district court or the executive branch of 
       the government. 
 
Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(emphasis in original). 
 
It would circumvent the intent of the gatekeeping 
function of S 2244 for a district court to proceed to rule on 
the merits of a second or successive petition or on any 
affirmative defense before the court of appeals has made a 
decision whether to let the petition for habeas corpus 
proceed in the district court. As has been explained: 
 
       AEDPA's prior approval provision allocates subject- 
       matter jurisdiction to the court of appeals by stripping 
       the district court of jurisdiction over a second or 
       successive habeas petition unless and until the court 
       of appeals has decreed that it may go forward. This 
       statutory directive means that a district court, faced 
       with an unapproved second or successive habeas 
       petition, must either dismiss it or transfer it to the 
       appropriate court of appeals. 
 
United States v. Enigwe, No. 92-00257, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15149, at *11-*12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1998) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 
(2d Cir. 1997)), aff'd 248 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished). Defenses such as the statute of limitations 
would be premature, particularly since successivity is 
reasonably treated as an issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Spivey v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 
No. 02-10416, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 976, at *5 (11th Cir. 
Jan. 24, 2002) (finding that where prisoner's S 1983 claim 
was the "functional equivalent" of a second habeas petition, 
and "he did not first apply with this Court for permission to 
file a second or successive petition as required by 28 U.S.C. 
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S 2244(b)(3)(A), the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain [his] claim"); United States v. Gallegos, 142 F.3d 
1211, 1212 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that when 
petitioner failed to obtain "prior authorization" from the 
court of appeals before filing his third habeas petition in 
the district court, the "district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction" to decide the petition and its order on the 
merits "must be vacated"); Nelson v. United States, 115 
F.3d 136, 136 (2d Cir. 1997) ("to the extent the district 
court dealt with the [successive] S 2255 motion on its 
merits, the judgment of that court be and it hereby is 
vacated for lack of jurisdiction in that court to entertain the 
motion" because petitioner had not obtained an order 
authorizing such a petition from the court of appeals); 
Pratt, 129 F.3d at 57 (same). 
 
I find similarly unpersuasive the majority's suggestion 
that the Commonwealth's failure to raise its statute of 
limitations defense in this court constituted a waiver. I do 
not suggest that a court of appeals would not consider the 
statute of limitations defense in deciding whether to grant 
permission to file a successive habeas, but I know of no 
rule, nor does the majority cite one, that requires the 
Commonwealth to raise it at the appellate level. The rules 
governing raising of affirmative defenses apply only to 
pleadings in the district court. Moreover, it is not the 
practice of this court to consider and determine a defense 
that had not been considered in the first instance by the 
district court. 
 
The majority also finds an equitable reason for its 
decision that the Commonwealth waived the statute of 
limitations defense. It refers to the lengthy period Robinson 
has waited for the court to consider the merits of his 
habeas petition, and places that responsibility on the 
Commonwealth. However, under the circumstances here, I 
do not believe the Commonwealth was unreasonable in 
challenging Robinson's habeas petition as successive. 
 
Robinson's initial federal habeas petition that was filed in 
1991 (before AEDPA) was dismissed in the District Court 
for procedural default, and this court denied his request for 
the issuance of a certificate of probable cause because of 
his failure to exhaust state remedies. Thus, when Robinson 
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filed another federal habeas petition in 1998, the 
Commonwealth argued in the District Court that the 
petition was a second petition under AEDPA which should 
not have been submitted to the District Court without an 
order from this court. The District Court agreed and 
dismissed the petition. Robinson appealed, and this court 
ordered the Commonwealth to show cause why the District 
Court's dismissal should not be reversed in light of Christy 
v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 1997), the decision of this 
court holding that dismissals of habeas petitions for failure 
to exhaust state claims are not dismissals on the merits 
and do not render a subsequent petition second or 
successive under the statute. 
 
This court's order was directed specifically to the 
Commonwealth filing an answer as to whether the habeas 
petition was successive. As proceedings were directed solely 
to determining whether or not the petition would be allowed 
under the successivity rules, there would have been no 
reason for the Commonwealth, as the majority suggests, to 
raise an alternate ground to uphold the dismissal, which 
might require the development of a record. The scope of 
review in the court of appeals upon a request for 
authorization to file a second or successive petition is 
limited to whether the applicant has made a prima facie 
showing that the petition complies with the habeas 
statute's substantive successive petition standards. 28 
U.S.C. S 2244(b)(3)(C). Because of this limited scope of 
review, the Commonwealth limited its response to the issue 
of successivity. 
 
After the Commonwealth conceded that Robinson's 
petition was not successive in light of the development of 
the law, this court remanded the petition to the District 
Court "for consideration as if it were [Robinson's] first 
habeas petition." App. at 17. This language mirrors that in 
our decision in Christy where we held that"when a prior 
petition has been dismissed without prejudice for failure to 
exhaust state remedies, no [prior] authorization is 
necessary and the petitioner may file his petition in the 
district court as if it were the first such filing." 115 F.3d at 
208 (emphasis added). Once the issue of successivity was 
disposed of, the Commonwealth could then move beyond 
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that threshold issue to present defenses to the petition 
such as the statute of limitations. It was only at this point 
that the normal rules regarding the waiver of defenses 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) came into effect. Because the 
Commonwealth raised the statute of limitations in its first 
pleading before the District Court on remand, I do not 
believe it has waived this defense. Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. 
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